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LESSONS LEARNED FROM GREAT BRITAIN'S HUMAN
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT: SHOULD THE UNITED
STATES REGULATE THE FATE OF UNUSED FROZEN EMBRYOS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Assisted reproductive technology, a general term encompass-
ing various methods of helping infertile couples to conceive chil-
dren, has received more than its share of media attention over the
past years. Recently, the media has focused on controversies in-
volving governmental regulation of the reproductive technology
industry.
On August 1, 1996, in compliance with a federal statute,1 fer-
tility clinic operators in Great Britain destroyed more than 3,000
frozen embryos. 2 Doctors removed the embryos from their freez-
ing containers, allowed them to thaw, and then destroyed the em-
bryos with a few drops of alcohol.3 Many desperate "mothers"
scrambled to save their embryos; however, most of them were un-
successful.4
The Catholic Church called the event a "prenatal massacre."'5
Italian doctors offered to "adopt" the embryos by purchasing and
transporting them to Italy for implantation into women willing to
receive them.6 Fertility experts .and health officials criticized the
destruction. 7 Anti-abortionists called August 1, 1996 a "day of
1. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
2. See Cindy Schreuder, Embryo Issue From American View, Unlike Britain, We
Have Little Regulation, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1996, at Cl.
3. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Ethical Furor Erupts in Britain: Should Embryos Be
Destroyed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al.
4. See Kathy Marks, Woman Ends Fight to Save Embryo, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 9, 1996, at 8. See also Cameron Simpson, Call for Changes to Law on
Embryos; Church Steps in as Clinics Prepare to Dispose of Frozen Stocks, HERALD
(Glasgow), Aug. 1, 1996, at 4.
5. See Ibrahim, supra note 3.
6. See id,
7. See Simpson, supra note 4.
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national shame."8
Great Britain is not alone in the spotlight of this controversy.
In May 1995, improprieties at a prominent fertility clinic at the
University of California, Irvine (UCI) were exposed.9 Three doc-
tors at that clinic allegedly transferred embryos from one patient
to another without either patient's consent or knowledge. 10 In the
eighteen months since UCI's fertility scandal unfolded, the clinic
closed, its three doctors were indicted, more than 80 civil lawsuits
were filed, and a one million dollar settlement has been paid to
two couples. 11 This incident spawned an immediate response from
California legislators.
12
Another incident involved Rhode Island's only fertility clinic.
In September 1995, two couples filed suit against Women and In-
fants Hospital for allegedly losing nine embryos.
13
Assisted reproductive technology has commanded society's
attention since the birth of the first "test tube baby" in 1978.14
Since that time, the United States and Great Britain have both
made headlines for their roles in the unfortunate fate of some em-
bryos. The method and extent of regulation to address these con-
cerns, however, differ greatly in each country.
Great Britain's regulations are codified in the Human Fertili-
zation and Embryology Act of 1990.15 This extensive act contains
forty-nine sections and runs fifty pages.16 The United States, by
contrast, has passed very limited legislation. The legislation per-
tains almost exclusively to data collection in the field.17 This
Comment analyzes the regulatory practices of the United States
8. See Ibrahim, supra note 3.
9. See Rex Dalton, UCSD Ousts 3 Doctors at Fertility Unit: Trio Has Been Accused
of Improprieties at UCI, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 25, 1995, at B3.
10. See id.
11. See Michelle Nicolosi, Fertility Scandal Begets Changes, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Nov. 16, 1996, Metro, at 1.
12. See 1996Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 863,865 (Deering 1996).
13. See Fertility Clinic Is Sued Over the Loss of Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at
26.
14. See Robert L. Stenger, The Law and Assisted Reproduction in the United King-
dom and United States, 9 CLEV. ST. J.L. & HEALTH 135, 139 (1994).
15. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
16. See id.
17. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 137.
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and Great Britain, assesses the fallout from the mass "thawing" in
Great Britain, and recommends that the U.S. federal government
not regulate the fate of unused cryopreserved 18 embryos. This
recommendation considers the constitutional rights of individuals
as well as practical legislative and technological issues.
Part II of the Comment describes the processes of in vitro
fertilization and cryopreservation. Part III discusses the current
U.S. approach to regulating assisted reproduction. Part IV focuses
on Britain's Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, which
mandates destruction of frozen embryos after ten years of storage.
Part V discusses the aftermath of the destruction of cryopreserved
embryos in Britain. Finally, Part VI presents issues for the U.S.
government to consider and recommends that the federal govern-
ment not regulate the fate of unused frozen embryos.
II. THE PROCESSES OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND CRYOGENIC
PRESERVATION OF EMBRYOS
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a medical procedure that affords
infertile couples an opportunity to conceive a child.19 To better
understand the legal implications of IVF, the following describes
the basic medical procedures involved in the cryopreservation of
IVF embryos.20
The IVF procedure takes approximately two weeks to com-
plete.21 First, the woman receives hormonal medication to hyper-
stimulate her ovaries to produce an increased number of eggs.22 A
second medication is then injected, stimulating a "hormonal surge"
18. "Cryopreservation" and "frozen" are used synonymously in this Comment. The
process of cryopreservation will be discussed in detail in Part II.
19. See Christi D. Ahnen, Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins,
Who Loses, and How Do We Decide?-An Analysis of Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and
State Statutes Affecting Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299 (1991).
20. For more detailed explanations see Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, FERTILITY &
STERILITY June 1990, Supp. 2, at 37S [hereinafter AFS] and ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY FROM LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES
(1989)
21. See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall
Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463,467 (1992).
22. See id.
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that causes ovulation in approximately thirty-six hours.23 The
next step involves removal of the eggs by either laparoscopy or ul-
trasound-guided transvaginal aspiration.
24
A laparoscopy can be performed approximately thirty-four
hours after ovulation, and on an outpatient basis, under general
anesthesia. 25 Two or three small incisions are made in the abdo-
men, through which a laparscope and a hollow needle are inserted.
The needle is used to retrieve the eggs.
26
Physicians utilize an ultrasound machine to perform ultra-
sound-guided transvaginal aspiration. 27 The physicians insert the
suctioning needle through the abdomen and bladder, or through
the vagina.28 Ultrasound-guided transvaginal aspiration may be
preferable for patients with abdominal adhesions. 29 Unlike la-
paroscopy, the procedure is less expensive and does not require
general anesthesia.
30
If suitable eggs are retrieved, the father will provide a sperm
sample. 31 Technicians combine the eggs and sperm, and wait to
see if fertilization occurs.32. If fertilization occurs, the embryos are
allowed to divide for about three days until they reach the two to
eight-cell stage. 33 The embryos are then either implanted imme-
diately in the patient or cryopreserved for later implantation.34
Cryopreservation is achieved by freezing the embryos in liq-
uid nitrogen at negative 195 degrees centigrade.35 After freezing,
the embryos are carefully stored and may later be thawed for im-
23. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 467.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 20, at 149.
28. See id.; Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 467.
29. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 467.
30. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 20, at 149.
31. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 467.
32. See AFS, supra note 20, at 37S.
33. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76
VA. L. REV. 437,441 (1990); BONNICKSEN, supra note 20, at 150.
34. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 468.
35. See id.
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plantation in a recipient's uterus. 36
Combining IVF and cryopreservation of embryos allows post-
poning embryo implantation until the negative effects of the ovar-
ian-stimulating hormone have passed.37 Furthermore, cryopreser-
vation of embryos for later use is far less expensive than extraction
and fertilization of eggs on each successive attempt at IVF.38
Although IVF is considered a medical miracle, it is contro-
versial. Over 100 special commission reports worldwide concen-
trated on the ethical and legal issues raised by IVF.39 Both the
United States and Great Britain have attempted to address these
controversies, but the two countries have very different ap-
proaches to regulating IVF and cryopreservation.
III. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH TO REGULATION
Davis v. Davis40 was the initial U.S. case that prompted con-
cern for the fate of unused embryos. In that case, frozen embryos
were at the center of a custody battle during a divorce proceed-
ing.41 Initially, Mary Sue Davis sought custody of the embryos for
future implantation. 42 During the course of the proceedings, how-
ever, Mary Sue remarried and wanted to donate the embryos to a
childless couple. 43 Junior Davis objected to granting Mary Sue
custody because he did not want to become a parent outside the
bounds of marriage.44
The Tennessee Supreme Court denied Mary Sue's request for
custody. In support of its denial, the Court stated that no prior
agreement had been made, and Mary Sue had other reasonable
36. See id.
37. See id. Ovarian-stimulating hormones temporarily reduce the ability of the
uterine lining to accept the fertilized embryo. See Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Re-
productive Technology: In Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Do-
nated Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 828 (1988).
38. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 468.
39. See Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted
Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329 (1991).
40. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
41. See id. at 589.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 590.
44. See id. at 589.
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ways to become a parent.45 For many commentators, the next
question was the fate of the frozen embryos.
46
A. Federal Regulations
Few U.S. federal regulations exist on the issue of assisted re-
productive technology.47 Moreover, none of these regulations deal
with unused embryos.48
One example of federal regulation is the National Institutes of
Health Revitalization Act of 1993.49 It created research centers
designed to study contraception, infertility, and the transplantation
of fetal tissue. 50
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of
199251 calls for annual reporting to the Centers for Disease Con-
trol of pregnancy success rates achieved by assisted reproductive
technology programs. 52 The Act also calls for the development of
a model program for certifying embryo laboratories. 53 This law
never went into effect, however, because of funding problems. 54 If
the law had gone into effect, compliance would have been volun-
tary and no penalties would have been assessed for failing to re-
port or for reporting falsely.55
There are numerous reasons for the failure to address issues
of human reproduction at the national level. 56 One reason is the
volatile issue of abortion, and another is concern over federal-
ism.57 Both issues are discussed in Section VI of this Comment.
45. See id. at 604.
46. See generally Ahnen, supra note 19, at 1304-05 (discussing cases prompting con-
cern over the fate of unused frozen embryos).
47. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 136-37.
48. See generally id. (discussing the limited extent of federal regulations).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 285g(5), 289g(1)-(2) (1995).
50. See id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(1)-(4) (1995).
52. See id. § 263a(1).
53. See id. § 263a(2).
54. See Diane M. Gianelli, Tighter Self-Regulation of Fertility Industry Sought, AM.
MED. NEWS, July 22, 1996, at 43.
55. See id.
56. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 137.
57. See id. at 137-38.
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B. Private Preconception Agreements
Clinics and gamete donors generally determine the fate of
embryos through private preconception agreements. 58 According
to Dr. Joseph D. Schulman, director of the Genetics and IVF Insti-
tute in Fairfax, Virginia, "as a matter of policy in virtually all in-
vitro fertilization centers, decisions are made by the individual
couples."'59 In the United States, most clinics offer to store em-
bryos for a specified period of time. In addition, the clinics ask
each couple to provide written direction on what should happen to
the embryos if the couple divorces, if one or both partners die, or if
they lose touch with the clinic. 60 There are usually four options for
dealing with unused embryos: storage, destruction, donation to
other infertile couples, or use in research. 61 If the clinics are un-
able to contact the couple, they normally try to follow the couple's
written directions. 62
A major problem with these agreements is that clients do not
truly contemplate the consequences of their decisions. 63 The
agreements are executed early in the process, well before clients
might face the events considered in the agreements. 64 Thus, the
clients may be bound by agreements that do not reflect their true
interests.65 In addition, the clients may not have been fully in-
formed about the issues in the agreement.66
A final problem is that clients are anxious to overcome infer-
tility problems and often consent to these agreements under un-
conscionable circumstances. 67 One commentator notes that "IVF
programs and embryo banks may have such monopoly power that
58. See, e.g., Schreuder, supra note 2, at Cl.
59. Ibrahim, supra note 3, at Al.
60. See Schreuder, supra note 2, at Cl.
61. See id.
62. See Ibrahim, supra note 3, at Al.
63. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 465. Professor John Robertson argues that pre-
conception agreements for disposition of embryos should not be enforceable because they
are analogous to preconception agreements "to abort, not to abort, or to give up for
adoption," which are unenforceable. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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the conditions they offer give couples little real choice, making
them the equivalent of adhesion contracts.
'68
Three elements must exist for a contract to be valid: offer, ac-
ceptance of the offer, and consideration. 69 An agreement may still
be unenforceable despite proper formation of the contract.70
Where a properly formed agreement contravenes the public policy
of a particular jurisdiction, courts have traditionally found the
agreement unenforceable. 71 No court has decided the viability of
unconscionability claims with regard to preconception agreements
between patients and fertility clinics.72 '
IV. THE BRITISH APPROACH TO REGULATION
On July 25, 1978, events in Great Britain spawned worldwide
public discussion of IVF. On this day, Louise Brown was born and
became the world's first "test tube" baby. 73
Following the birth of Louise Brown, churches commissioned
many committees to study the ethical, legal, social, and political
ramifications of IVF.74 In July 1982, the British Government's
Secretary of State for Social Services announced the establishment
of a sixteen-member committee of. inquiry. 75  Philosopher Mary
Warnock headed the committee, which was composed of theologi-
ans, social workers, attorneys, and scientists. 76
68. Id.
69. See Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597,598 (Ind. 1994).
70. See id.
71. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). Federal judges
occasionally take similar actions using the Constitution. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (finding a private contract unenforceable because it discriminated based on
race).
72. Nq such cases have been reported yet. At least one court, however, decided in
favor of a donor couple based on a preconception agreement. The couple wanted to
transfer their embryo to another institution, but the defendant institution refused, arguing
that the preconception agreement did not allow for transfer of the embryo. The court
held the agreement established an ownership right for the gamete donors, and therefore,
a right to transfer the embryos. See York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 423-27 (E.D. Va.
1989).
73. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 139.
74. See id. at 140.
75. See id. at 140-41.
76. See id.
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Regulating Frozen Embryos
A. The Warnock Report
The Warnock Report was presented to the British Parliament
on June 26, 1984. 77 Its findings and recommendations were broad,
covering topics ranging from artificial insemination to IVF, from
surrogacy issues to research issues.78 Subsequent legislation incor-
porated many of the Warnock Report's recommendations. 79
Specifically, the Report recommended a definite time limit for
the storage of frozen embryos because of the unknown effects of
long-term storage and the legal and ethical complications that
might arise over disposal of embryos whose parents have died, ob-
tained a divorce, or otherwise separated.80 Furthermore, the Re-
port concluded that it would be "unreasonable and impractical to
expect those responsible for storage to maintain all eggs and se-
men stored indefinitely. ' 81 The report, therefore, recommended a
review of the embryos after five years to assess the couple's wishes,
with a maximum of ten years of storage. 82 After the ten-year pe-
riod, the right to use or dispose of the embryos should pass to the
storage authority. 83
B. The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act
Great Britain's Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of
1990 (HFEA) governs a wide range of assisted reproductive tech-
nology activities. 84 One of the HFEA's provisions created the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, a statutory li-
censing authority.85
77. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY at v (1984)
[hereinafter WARNOCK REPORT].
78. See id.
79. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 142.
80. See WARNOCK REPORT, supra note 77, at 56.
81. Id. at 55.
82. See id. at 56.
83. See id. Other recommendations include: no right of ownership in a human em-
bryo; when one member of a couple dies, the right to use or dispose of the embryo should
pass to the survivor (or to the storage authority, should both die); and when there is no
agreement between the couple, the right to determine use or disposal should pass to the
storage authority as if the ten year period had expired. See id. at 56-57.
84. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
85. See id. § 8.
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The major effect of the HFEA is the licensing of persons and
premises involved with reproductive technologies.8 6 Licenses may
be granted for providing treatment services, storage of gametes
and embryos, and research.8 7  The HFEA also establishes
boundaries beyond which treatment and research may not venture,
defines technologies to be licensed, and determines the legal status
of the resulting children.88
The pertinent portion of the HFEA, involving storage of em-
bryos, went into effect on August 1, 1991.89 Section 14 states that
"no gametes or embryos shall be kept in storage for longer than
the statutory storage period and, if stored at the end of the period,
shall be allowed to perish." 90 The HFEA originally set the statu-
tory storage period at five years. 91 Any clinic that violates this
storage provision runs the risk of losing its license and possible
criminal prosecution. 92
In May 1996, the British government, amid growing concern
of the impending mass embryo thawing, amended section 14 of the
HFEA. 93 This amendment extended the statutory maximum stor-
age time, as long as both the "mother" and "father" consent to
The Authority shall:
(a) keep under review information about embryos and any subsequent
development of embryos and about the provision of treatment serv-
ices and activities governed by this Act, and advise the Secretary of
State, if he asks to do so,
(b) publicise the services provided to the public by the Authority or pro-
vided in pursuance of licences,
(c) provide, to such extent as is considered appropriate, advice and in-
formation for persons to whom licences apply or who are receiving
treatment services or providing gametes or embryos for use for the
.purposes of activities governed by the Act, or may wish to do so, and
(d) perform such other functions as may be specified in regulations.
86. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 146.
87. See Human Fertilization and Embryology Act § 11.
88. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 147.
89. See id. at 145 n. 75. The administrative arrangements for the HFEA and section
36 concerning surrogacy went into effect on November 7, 1990, while all other provisions
except section 30 (parental orders) became effective on August 1, 1991. See id.
90. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act § 14.
91. See id.
92. See id. §§ 18, 41. An offending person is "liable on conviction on indictment to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or a fine or both." Id. § 41.
93. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Regulations, 1996, § 2 (Eng.).
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storage beyond five years.94
C. British Privacy Law
Under British law, there is little question regarding Parlia-
ment's authority to pass legislation such as the HFEA. Unlike
U.S. law, English law does not explicitly recognize a right to pri-
vacy.95 Privacy rights in Britain, to the extent they exist, are for-
mulated quite differently than in the United States. 96 In fact, a
popular treatise on privacy rights in Britain does not discuss free-
dom of choice with respect to sexuality, reproduction, or famil-
ial/parental relations. 97 Although British law addresses these is-
sues, they do not fall within the rubric of privacy. 98 Thus, one
commentator has referred to privacy rights in Britain as a "patch-
work affair."99
Early British judicial decisions and legislation lacked any no-
tion of privacy. 100 This was a reflection of Britain's reserved
authority to make laws regulating any aspect of community life. 101
Thus, the British citizen has no guaranteed right to seek redress
against intrusive government activity. 102
Despite government resistance, British citizens have seized
upon the concept of privacy as a potential means to obtain judicial
relief from unduly burdensome government instrusion. 103 Citizens
have lobbied Parliament for a statutory right of privacy, argued be-
fore the courts for a common law right of privacy, and traveled to
Strasbourg, France to obtain a hearing before an international
human rights court.104 Unfortunately, these efforts to carve out an
94. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Regulations, 1996, Schedule (Eng.).
Maximum storage periods range from six to thirty-nine years, depending on the woman's
age at the time of the procedure. See id.
95. See Gerald Dworkin, Privacy and the Law, in PRIVACY 115 (J. Young ed., 1978).
96. 'See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Autonomy, Community and Traditions of Liberty:
The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1402 (1991).
97. See RAYMOND WACKS, THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 1-85 (1980).
98. See Krotoszynski, supra note 96, at 1402.
99. Id.
100. See WALTER PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 60 (1979).
101. See Krotoszynski, supra note 96, at 1402.
102. See id. at 1403.
103. See id.
104. See id.
1997] 1037
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
effective institutional process to guarantee privacy interests have
largely been unsuccessful and the prospects for reform are
bleak. 105
The primary source of legal rights in Britain is statutory
law.10 6 "Respect for the supremacy of Parliament, fear that rapid
change in the law will create uncertainty and a tendency to main-
tain a positivist jurisprudential outlook preclude British judges
from developing social policy."1 07 These same factors also dis-
courage judges from using broad legal constructs, such as privacy,
to grant rights. 108
It is possible that the HFEA has not been challenged because
British courts do not recognize privacy. British Parliament freely
regulates into the realms of privacy, which the U.S. Supreme Court
guards against. Abortion represents an illustration of this differ-
ence.
"Theoretically, the right to abortion enjoys less protection in
Britain than in the United States."'109 As opposed to U.S. law, the
British Abortion Act 110 generally criminalizes abortion in Brit-
ain. 111 In practice, however, the Act's exception clause swallows
the whole Act. The exception clause allows legal abortions for the
physical and mental well-being of the mother and in the case of
deformed fetuses.112 By liberally construing this provision, courts,
with Parliament's tacit approval, have effectively permitted abor-
tion. 113
Parliament's deference to a woman's decision to have an
abortion has not, however, led to general discussions of rights of
privacy.114 Rather, British citizens appear to rely on a principle of
governmental self-restraint coupled with a notion of liberty vest-
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1404.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1408.
110. Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87 (Eng.).
111. See Krotoszynski, supra note 96, at 1408.
112. See Abortion Act § 1.
113. See Krotoszynski, supra note 96, at 1406.
114. See id.
1038 [Vol. 19:1027
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ing in the citizenry. 115 In other words, that which Parliament does
not prohibit is permitted. 116 Thus, privacy is "protected" by Par-
liament's indifference or deliberate inaction. 117 Nonetheless, no
procedure exists to prevent Parliament from impinging on privacy
rights.118 "Individual autonomy is subject to summary abrogation
by parliamentary fiat." 119
In contrast to U.S. courts, British courts consistently refuse to
recognize or create any rights of privacy. 120 British judges believe
it is "no function of the courts to legislate in a new field."' 121 Be-
cause British courts view legal reform as Parliament's prerogative,
it would be anomalous for them to unilaterally create a right of
privacy. 122
One can infer that Parliament had the authority to pass the
HFEA because it has the authority to regulate abortion and both
issues affect rights to privacy. Furthermore, with plenary power
vested in Parliament and a judicial system that automatically de-
fers to Parliament on issues concerning privacy rights, challenges
to the HFEA and its provisions on frozen embryos have not been
successful. 123
V. THE IMPACT AND FALLOUT OF THE BRITISH MASS
"EMBRYOCIDE"
"In the end, some 3300 embryos-left by couples who had lost
touch with the clinic or chose not to come forward-were de-
stroyed ... a move some critics charged as tantamount to murder.
Others, however, said these products of in vitro fertilization were
little more than specks of genetic material."'1 24
On August 1, 1996, the lapse of the five-year statutory period
115. See Harry Street, Freedom, the Individual and the Law 284 (1963).
116. See id.
117. See Krotoszynski, supra note 96, at 1409.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1411.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 1412.
123. To'date, court cases have only dealt with mothers seeking to delay destruction of
their frozen embryos beyond the five-year limit stated in HFEA.
124. Schreuder, supra note 2, at C1.
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for embryo storage sparked a world-wide controversy. 125 Al-
though embryos had been destroyed before, this was the first time
that the law required their destruction. 126 Moreover, it was the
first time that such a large quantity of embryos had been simulta-
neously destroyed. 127
Opponents of the HFEA were troubled by the fact that as
many as 650 couples did not respond to inquiries about what they
wished to do with the embryos. 128 Over 900 couples could not be
contacted. 129 The total number of embryos destroyed was roughly
6,000, of which 3,300 were the product of parents that could not be
reached. 130
A. Ethical Concerns of the HFEA
Supporters of the HFEA believe that it was ethically sound
for the clinics to destroy the embryos because the couple's rights to
find happiness by having a child outweigh the embryo's rights. 131
This is a utilitarian approach to ethics in which maximizing happi-
ness determines rightness.
Opponents of infertility treatment argue that children are gifts
from God and that IVF.is the first step toward genetically engi-
neered children. 132 This is essentially a deontological approach to
ethics in which God prescribes duties.
As one commentator has noted, "consensus is unlikely when
proponents of a result based upon a utilitarian calculus face deon-
tologically-based objections. '' 133 It is nearly impossible to reach a
consensus when one side attempts to justify what the other side
finds absolutely unacceptable. 134
125. See Ibrahim, supra note 3; Marks, supra note 4; Simpson, supra note 4.
126. See Ibrahim, supra note 3.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Lynn Cochrane, Childless Chill From the Freezer, SCOTSMAN, Aug. 1, 1996, at
10.
130. See Simpson, supra note 4.
131. See Cochrane, supra note 129.
132. See id.
133. Stenger, supra note 14, at 138.
134. See id.
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Some advocates in Britain believe that doctors overstimulate
ovaries for convenience, to accelerate the procedure. 135 Thus,
these advocates believe the answer is neither to create extra em-
bryos nor to allow cryopreservation of embryos. 136 This is also the
Roman Catholic Church's position. 137 The Church asks that, at a
minimum, the embryos be treated with dignity and given a proper
funeral.1 38
The British government believes the HFEA's mandated dis-
posal is justified for fear that prolonged freezing might damage
cells.1 39 Some proponents of the HFEA argue that the disposal
protocol is justified because it is more respectful of embryos than
nature. Forty percent of human embryos are "lost flushed down
the loo without the parents even being aware that they have con-
ceived. 140
B. Practical Concerns of the HFEA
Sad and unfortunate stories abounded during the mass thaw-
ing. In Cambridge, a doctor received a faxed letter from a couple
living overseas asking him to extend the storage period of their
embryos, another five years, but the letter arrived twenty-four
hours too late. As a result, their embryos were destroyed.141
Another couple's eggs were fertilized by an anonymous sperm
donor and the resulting embryos frozen for future use. 142 This
couple also wished to extend the storage of the embryos. 143 The
anonymous donor, however, could not be traced, and therefore,
did not consent to continued storage. 144 The couple considered
bringing court action to prevent the destruction, but did not want
135. See Cochrane, supra note 129.
136. See id.
137. See Simpson, supra note 4.
138. See Ibrahim, supra note 3.
139. See Cochrane, supra note 129.
140. Embryology Has Reached Maturity, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 1996, Perspec-
tives, at 2.
141. See Jojo Moyes, A World of Anguish in an Inch of Glass; "Blanket" Legislation
That is Causing Despair, INDEP. (Eng.), at 1.
142. See Simpson, supra note 4.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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their private grief to become public.145
Many believe that the HFEA was carelessly drafted because it
fails to account for the extent of egg and semen donation and the
problems in tracing couples overseas. 146 Furthermore, due to the
requirement of express consent of both "parents," opponents of
the law predict increasing problems as the destruction of embryos
becomes a regular event. 147
The practical concerns with such regulations of embryo stor-
age and disposal are clear. Great Britain's struggle to balance
health risks of long term storage with religious and ethical consid-
erations has many lessons to teach other nations. The United
States should consider these lessons in deciding whether to regu-
late this matter.
VI. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES REGULATE THE FATE OF
UNUSED FROZEN EMBRYOS: ISSUES TO CONSIDER
Although there has been recent Congressional action regard-
ing infertility and the impact of assisted reproduction techniques,
the United States lags far behind many comparable countries in
addressing such issues.148 The consensus among most countries is
that storage of gametes and embryos should be subject to time
limitations. 149 This section of the Comment focuses on whether
the U.S. federal government should mandate the disposal of frozen
embryos after a specified time limitation has expired.
A. The Legal Status of Embryos
The legal status of embryos is an unsettled area of the law.150
But an understanding of the embryo's current standing in law is
central to resolving the issue at hand.151 The main problem in de-
termining the legal status of embryos is striking a balance between
respect for human life and concerns of procreative choice and
145. See id.
146. See Moyes, supra note 141.
147. See id.
148. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 136-37.
149. See Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 39, at 332-33.
150. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 477-88.
151. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 450.
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bodily integrity. 152
While there are criminal and tort laws that clearly apply to in
utero fetuses and embryos, application of these laws to preimplan-
tation embryos is not clear.153 Furthermore, there are three pos-
sible designations for preimplantation embryos: persons, property,
or entities deserving "special respect."'1 54 Despite these ambigui-
ties, Professor John Robertson posits that the legal status of pre-
implantation embryos can be determined by examining the locus
and scope of decisional authority over embryos.
155
The parties with possible claims of decisional authority over
preimplantation embryos include the individual gamete donors,
the couple jointly, the physicians who created the embryos, and
the fertility clinic that has actual possession of the embryos.
156
Professor Robertson concludes that of all the parties with potential
claims of decisional authority, the couple that donates gametes has
the strongest claim. 15
7
First, Professor Robertson argues that whether or not the em-
bryos are rights-bearing entities is separate from the more impor-
tant question of who has decisional authority over the embryos. 158
Therefore, "because the embryo results from the voluntary
gametic contribution of two individuals, and represents their po-
tential biologic offspring, they should have joint dispositional
authority over the external embryos resulting from their gam-
etes."159
Second, traditions regarding property rights over one's own
body parts support the claim of gamete donors. 160 Gamete pro-
viders are the original owners of their gametes and have a right to
decide whether they want to bear offspring. 161 "The person de-
152. See id. at 437.
153. See id. at 450-52.
154. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 477-88; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-97
(concluding that preembryos are not persons or property, "but occupy an interim cate-
gory that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.").
155. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 452.
156. See id. at 455.
157. See id. at 455-56.
158. See id. at 456.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 457.
161. See id.
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cides whether he or she will-through masturbation, egg retrieval,
or coitus-make his or her gametes available for examination, gift,
or reproduction." 162 Thus, a person may have a cause of action for
battery if gametes are removed from the body without consent. 1
63
Moreover, gamete donors may have a cause of action for conver-
sion if gametes are used for purposes not contemplated by the do-
nors (e.g., selling them to others or creating cell-lines). 164
Finally, as discussed in the following subsection, the decisional
authority of gamete donors is constitutionally protected. "If peo-
ple have a fundamental right to decide to procreate or not, then
control of their gametes, including their combined, embryonic
form, is necessary to exercise that choice. '165
B. Constitutional Issues
The lack of federal regulation in the area of assisted repro-
duction as a whole, and the fate of. unused cryopreserved embryos
in particular, is mainly due to the volatility of the abortion issue in
the United States. 166 The major change at the federal level came
when abortion became legal in 1973 with the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.167 The Court held that a
woman's right to an abortion was unrestricted until viability (the
point when the fetus can survive outside the womb).168
The Roe court implemented a trimester system whereby the
pregnant woman's interests and the state's interests change as the
fetus develops. 169 During the first trimester of pregnancy, the de-
cision to abort cannot be regulated by the state, but must be left to
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id. But c.f Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal.3d 120,
136-37 (1990) (holding that a patient, who did not expect to retain possession of his spleen
cells, did not have a cause of action for conversion against doctors who created a lucrative
cell line from the patient's spleen cells). The argument for property rights over embryos
is stronger than rights over organ cells because of the reproductive significance of gam-
etes and the fact that gamete donors, in the IVF context, fully expect to retain possession
of their embryos.
165. See Robertson, supra note 33, at 460 n.62.
166. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 137.
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. See id. at 162-64.
169. See id.
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the woman. 170 This demarcation at the first trimester is made be-
cause, up to this point, the mortality rate for mothers undergoing
abortions is lower than for those undergoing normal childbirth.
171
. After the first trimester, states may only regulate abortion "to
the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preserva-
tion and protection of maternal health. ' 172 After viability, which
the Court determined to be in the third trimester (between
twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks), the state's interest in the fe-
tus as "potential life" becomes compelling. 173 The state may pro-
hibit abortion during the third trimester, except when it is neces-
sary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
174
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe's essential
holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.175 The plurality, how-
ever, rejected Roe's trimester analysis and recognized the state's
substantial interest in potential life throughout the pregnancy.
176
This analysis suggests that the U.S. federal government has an
interest in potential life which may extend to preimplantation em-
bryos. Thus, the pressing question is whether the federal govern-
ment can require disposal of unused embryos.
Under federalism, states have generally had the power to
regulate matters such as family law-definitions of marriage, fam-
ily, parenthood, legitimacy-health and medical procedures. 177
One commentator has concluded, however, that assisted repro-
duction deserves the same legal protection as "natural" reproduc-
tion.178 Under this reasoning, state interference with individual
choices to use IVF is not justified. 179.
The federal government may impose uniform laws when the
170. See id at 163-64.
171. See id. at 163.
172. Id. at 163.
173. See id. at 160, 163.
174. See id. at 164-65.
175. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
176. See id. at 837.
177. See Stenger, supra note 14, at 138.
178. See Jon F. Merz, The Search for Coherence in Reproductive Policy, 17 J. LEGAL
MED. 169, 171 (1995) (reviewing JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:
FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994)).
179. See id.
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issue is resolved on the basis of federal constitutional rights. 180
Thus, the federal government may impose uniformity with regard
to the fate of embryos, because their fate invokes federal constitu-
tional rights belonging to the parents, or less likely, to the em-
bryos.
The constitutional issue of disposal of embryos, similar to
abortion, turns on an analysis of privacy rights.181 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has traditionally extended the right of privacy to is-
sues of family, marriage and procreation.182 An embryo's fate un-
doubtedly involves issues of procreation, an area in which the
court chooses to protect individual choice. 183
Because privacy rights are implied in the Constitution,1 84 it is
not entirely clear how far these rights stretch. With abortion, the
U.S. Supreme Court balanced freedom of choice against potential
life. In the case of frozen embryos, the balancing would be differ-
ent. With cryopreserved embryos, the court would balance the
rights of a potential life along with the procreative rights of the
gamete donors, against practical considerations of storage space,
the right to create private contracts, and scientific questions of vi-
ability after long term storage,
Even under the U.S. Supreme Court's more recent "undue
burden" analysis, 185 statutes affecting privacy rights must be care-
fully crafted in order to pass constitutional muster. Under this
analysis, the Court examines whether the implicated law presents a
"substantial obstacle" to the exercise of a liberty interest.186 Pro-
creation is clearly, at minimum, a liberty interest as it has already
180. See id.
181. In Roe v. Wade, the Court based its decision to legalize abortion primarily on the
implied right to privacy. 410 U.S. at 153.
182. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (privacy protects right of interracial
marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy rights in the use of con-
traceptive materials); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (privacy rights in fam-
ily relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (privacy
rights in procreation); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (privacy rights in
child rearing and education).
183. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
184. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
185. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877.
186. See id.
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been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights of man." 187
In Planned Parenthood, the Court determined that requiring
spousal notification prior to obtaining an abortion presents an un-
due burden.188 The Court based its decision on the premise that
the provision was likely to deter abortion as though the govern-
ment "had outlawed abortion in all cases."' 189 Likewise, requiring
destruction of embryos after a maximum storage period presents
an undue burden on the gamete donors' exercise of the right to
procreation because the destruction of their embryos may fore-
close any possibility of conceiving a child.
This constitutional analysis requires further attention in the
future. 190 For the purposes of this Comment, however, it is clear
that when regulating the fate of "potential lives," serious concerns
that do not arise in Great Britain become critical under U.S. con-
stitutional law.
C. State Regulations
Many states have enacted laws that regulate activities and
rights associated with assisted reproductive technology.191 Most
state laws governing assisted reproductive technology pertain to
insurance coverage for medical procedures. Some, however, de-
fine the rights and duties of parents and physicians, 192 and others
have been enacted in direct response to recent scandals. 193
The scandal at the UCI fertility clinic spawned an immediate
187. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
188. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 894-94.
189. See id.
190. For a compelling analysis based on hypothetical circumstances, see Lisa Hem-
phill, American Abortion Law Applied to New Reproductive Technology, 32 JURIMETRICS
J. 361 (1992).
191. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137 (Michie 1995) (regulating insurance cov-
erage); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (Deering 1996) (insurance coverage);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (1994) (insurance coverage); FLA. STAT. § 742.13 (1996)
(surrogacy arrangements); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.5 (1995) (insurance
coverage); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m (West 1996) (insurance coverage); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1-30 (1995) (providing required examinations and counseling, and
penalties for violations); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (Consol. 1996) (surrogacy arrange-
ments); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102 (West 1997) (surrogacy arrangements); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.3 (Michie 1996) (required testing for gamete donors).
192. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:124, 126-28, 130 (West 1996).
193. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 863 (West); 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 865 (West).
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response from California legislators. As a result, new legislation
went into effect on January 1, 1997.194 The new law requires "a
physician and surgeon who removes sperm or ova from a patient
to obtain a prescribed written consent from the patient before the
sperm or ova are used for a purpose other than reimplantation in
the same patient or implantation in the spouse of the patient. '195
Furthermore, the law makes it a felony for anyone to "knowingly
use sperm, ova or embryos in assisted reproduction technology, for
any purpose other than that indicated by the sperm, ova or embryo
provider's signature on a written consent form. ' ' 196 The California
laws, while responsive to recent controversies, are indicative of the
limited extent of regulation by most states in this area.
Louisiana has one of the more comprehensive statutes govern-
ing the status of human embryos. 197 The law regulates ownership
of embryos, safekeeping of in vitro embryos, qualifications for
clinics, and duties of gamete donors.198 The Louisiana law re-
quires that medical facilities meet the standards of the American
Fertility Society and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists. 199 Additionally, the clinic must be directed by a
medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in Louisiana. The di-
rector must also possess specialized training and skills with respect
to in vitro fertilization that conform to the standards of the Ameri-
can Fertility Society and the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists. 200 Most importantly, the physician is deemed
temporary guardian of' an embryo if the identity of the donors is
unknown. 201 This guardianship status exists "until adoptive im-
plantation can occur. '202
Despite the fact that states may have a strong interest in pro-
tecting the potential offspring, few of them have enacted laws in
194. See id.
195. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 863 (West).
196. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 865 (West).
197. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:124, 126-28, 130 (West 1996).
198. See id.
199. See id. § 128.
200. See id.
201. See id. § 124.
202. Id.
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this area.20 3 The lack of state laws governing the fate of unused
frozen embryos most likely occurs for the same reason there is a
lack of federal regulations. While federalism concerns suggest that
regulation of assisted reproductive technology be left to the states,
if the states choose to regulate, they risk conflicting with individual
privacy rights. As Professor Robertson notes, "unless carefully
crafted to respect the couple's procreative liberty, state limits on
embryo storage are likely to be found unconstitutional.
' 204
D. Other Legislative Options
Commentators have discussed a variety of legislative options.
One possibility is to require transfer of unused embryos to willing
recipients.205 This option preserves the state's interest in safe-
guarding health; however, it creates several problems. First, it
does not circumvent the constitutional protections afforded to the
gamete donors because the law still interferes with their privacy
right to procreation. Second, there is a practical problem in that
the supply of embryos greatly exceeds the demand for them.
206
A second option is*to require donation of unused embryos to
research. 207 While this option may contribute greatly to medical
technology advances, it also poses serious problems. Again, the
issue of the donors' constitutional rights rears its head. In addi-
tion, this option is likely to ignite moral outrage if not carefully
regulated and enforced. 20 8
A final option is limiting the number of eggs that may be fer-
tilized.209 The law may allow a physician to decide how many eggs
to fertilize based on the number of children that the couple plans
203. One might argue that the states have a strong interest in the health of "potential
lives." The American Fertility Society recommends that the maximum storage time for
embryos not exceed the reproductive life of a woman who provides the egg. See AFS,
supra note 20, at 60S. At least one commentator, however, questions the effectiveness of
a law that is meant to protect offspring, when it might prevent their existence. See Rob-
ertson, supra note 33, at 495.
204. Robertson, supra note 33, at 495.
205. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 491.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See, e.g., id. at 492.
209. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 496; Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hy-
nes, Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a
Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97,118 (1990).
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to have. 210 Limiting the number of fertilized eggs available for
implantation is a difficult option because the success rate of the
IVF process is unpredictable. If all of the fertilized embryos are
unsuccessfully implanted, a couple may have to repeat the entire
IVF process again.211 On the other hand, if IVF succeeds immedi-
ately or the couple decides to have fewer children than previously
contemplated, a surplus of embryos remains. This surplus, how-
ever, leaves legislators with the same problems discussed above.
F Technological Advances
A final consideration is current state of the art and future
technological advances. Future techniques and procedures may
render the embryo disposal issue moot.
One such possible technique is egg-freezing. 212 It is currently
the most effective and promising alternative to embryo-
freezing. 213 As in IVF, multiple eggs are removed from the
woman for the possibility of fertilization. 214 Instead of immedi-
ately fertilizing all of the eggs, however, the doctor selects one egg
for fertilization and immediately implants that egg.215. The remain-
ing eggs are frozen for possible use at a later time.216
Although some eggs may become unusable in the freezing and
thawing process, this is of little moral or ethical concern because
an egg alone is not yet a human being.217 Additionally, because
eggs may be fertilized as needed for immediate implantation, egg-
freezing avoids the problem of unused embryos.218 This procedure
is still in the development stages, but as early as 1986, children
were born via egg-freezing. 219
210. See Perry & Schneider, supra note 21, at 496.
211. See id.
212. See Browne & Hynes, supra note 209, at 100.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. See also Human-egg Banks: Frozen to Life, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1988, at
88 [hereinafter Frozen to Life].
217. See Browne & Hynes, supra note 209, at 100. See also Interview: Alan Trounson,
OMNI, Dec. 1985, at 83, 126.
218. See Browne & Hynes, supra note 209, at 100.
219. See id.; Frozen to Life, supra note 216.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Reminiscent of the Warnock Committee in Britain, a variety
of U.S. groups called for a study of current ethical and clinical
guidelines in the fertility industry after the scandal at the UCI
fertility clinic.220 Some are calling for more stringent voluntary
guidelines. 221 Others desire mandatory standards, with penalties
for wrongdoing. 222 Yet others are content with the status quo.223
Although scandals and controversies have arisen in Great
Britain, the United States, and throughout the world, there is a
significant difference between a government mandated "mass em-
bryocide" and unethical or bungling physicians. Whether the fed-
eral government should regulate all aspects of the assisted repro-
ductive technology industry is a broad question beyond the scope
of this Comment. Instead, the focus here is specifically on the
prudence of federally mandated disposal of unused cryopreserved
embryos.
Several considerations counsel against a U.S. federal govern-
ment mandate on the disposal of unused frozen embryos. One
reason not to regulate is that the U.S. medical profession, histori-
cally, has not looked kindly at outside regulation of the profes-
sion.224 It would also be nearly impossible to create legislation
that would satisfy the moral and ethical needs of the industry, the
patients, and U.S. society. These concerns, however, can be dis-
missed as a fear of confronting difficult challenges, rather than as
legitimate reasons. There are other considerations, however, that
suggest the U.S. government should not require disposal of unused
embryos.
First, U.S. constitutional law recognizes the right to choose
whether or not to procreate. The British Parliament did not have
this concern when it passed the HFEA. If a similar law was passed
in the United States there would be, at a minimum, numerous
challenges to its constitutionality. These challenges would be suc-
220. See Diane M. Gianelli, Ethics, Fertility Groups Consider Regulatory Options, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 13, 1995, at 7.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
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cessful because the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recog-
nized privacy rights in matters of family and procreation. 225
Second, due to rapid technological advances, there is a high
likelihood that cryopreservation of embryos will become an obso-
lete technique, rendering such legislation moot. Because tech-
niques such as egg-freezing are presently a reality, the argument
against a federal mandate for disposal of embryos becomes
stronger.
Furthermore, concerns about the viability of embryos after
prolonged freezing have subsided since the HFEA was drafted.226
Many scientists now believe that embryos can be frozen indefi-
nitely.227 Thus, even if technology does not render mandatory dis-
posal laws moot, increased knowledge about the current process of
cryopreservation does.
Finally, there are many possible alternatives that legislators
may consider, only a few of which have been discussed here.
While these options have their problems, they do not carry the
draconian finality of mandatory destruction.
In the end, the disposal issue is best left- to private contract.
This option keeps the decision with the individuals, avoiding any
invasion of privacy rights. It also allows flexibility to keep pace
with advancing technology. For example, if egg freezing were to
become the standard infertility procedure, private contracts could
easily adjust for the new issues and concerns rather than waiting
for legislative action. Finally, any apprehension about the pa-
tient's state of mind can be resolved by educating the public. For
example, one of the benefits of the UCI fertility clinic scandal is
that more infertility patients are now openly discussing pertinent
issues with their physicians. 228 Such increased discussion may re-
lieve concerns about unconscionable adhesion contracts.
Although assisted reproductive technology is a controversial
issue, with many areas subject to regulation, government man-
225. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
226. See Cochrane, supra note 129.
227. See id.
228. See Diane M. Gianelli, Fertility Scandal Raises Call for Regulation, AM. MED.
NEWS, Sept. 11, 1995, at 3.
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dated disposal of embryos is difficult to justify. A potential life
should not be terminated when it is against the wishes of the
mother and father. The bottom line is that any option is better
than a government mandate, and the best option is to leave the
decision to the parties involved.
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